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PUTTING PRESIDENTIAL
PERFORMANCE IN THE FEDERAL
APPOINTMENTS PROCESS IN
PERSPECTIVE
Michael J. Gerhardt'
INTRODUCTION
For all of the attention given in recent years to dramatic con-
firmation contests, little or no serious consideration has been given
to role of the President in the federal appointments process. In-
stead, commentators have been absorbed with the Senate's role,
particularly in judicial confirmation proceedings (and, even then,
primarily only those for Supreme Court justices).' The reasons for
this focus are easy to identify. First, Supreme Court confirmation
t Dean and Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law.
B.A., Yale University; M.Sc., London School of Economics; J.D., University of Chicago.
I am very grateful to my fellow participants on the Symposium's federal appointments
panel, particularly Ron Kahn and Jeffrey Tulis, for their helpful comments on an earlier
draft. Some of the material in this article will also appear in two other publications: my
longer article entitled "A Comprehensive Theory of the Federal Appointments Process" to
be published in a forthcoming issue of the Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy; and
my book, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS.
1. See, e.g, STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS: CLEANING UP THE FED-
ERAL APPOITrMENTS PROCESS 23-28, 37-44, 134, 138-44 (1994) (discussing the ways in
which his friends Zoe Baird, Lani Guinier, and Anita Hill were abused in their respective
Senate confirmation proceedings); PAUL SIMON, ADVICE & CONSENT: CLARENCE THOMAS,
ROBERT BORK AND THE INTRIGUING HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT'S NOMINATION
BATrLES 295-98 (1992); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE Tins HONORABLE COURT. How
THE CHOICES OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES SHAPES OUR HISTORY 170 (1985) (suggesting
in the midst of a relatively long period of Republican dominance of the Supreme Court
selection process that history justifies a more vigorous Senate inquiry into the likely ideol-
ogies of judicial nominees); David Strauss & Cass Sunstein, The Senate, the Constitution,
and the Confirmation Process, 101 YALE LJ. 1491, 1494-1502 (1992) (arguing that after
12 consecutive Republican appointments to the Supreme Court the Senate is constitutional-
ly entitled to pressure the President into appointing less conservative justices for the sake
of restoring ideological balance to the Court).
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proceedings often provide the public (if not legal scholars and
political commentators) with a rare internal glimpse into the power-
ful but largely secretive and mysterious institution of the Supreme
Court and the lives and backgrounds of the people who wield its
power. Moreover, the clash between the President and the Senate
over high stakes nominations, such as those to the Supreme Court,
often reveals a lot about the characters and agendas of the political
leaders involved. Such clashes also provide a great deal of drama,
and the drama in turn attracts considerable public attention. In
addition, there is widespread concern among political scientists and
particularly legal scholars about the risk posed to judicial indepen-
dence by Senate inquiries into judicial nominees' likely ideolo-
gies.2 The concern is that such inquiries have pressured judicial
nominees (particularly those to the Supreme Court) to conform
their views to those held by a majority of Senators for the sake of
securing their confirmations.
The preoccupation with Supreme Court confirmation hearings
has left a huge void in the literature on the federal appointments
process This symposium's panel on the President's appointments
power is to be commended for making a serious effort to fill this
void. Indeed, all of the panelists recognize that two perspectives
are crucial for fully explaining and evaluating presidential perfor-
mance. The first is from the inside of the federal appointments
process. This inside perspective is concerned with a President's
interaction or relations with the Senate on the issue as well as the
organization within his administration or executive office for mak-
ing decisions on appointments matters. The second perspective is
from the outside of the process. This view examines the external
forces (i.e., the social, political, economic, historical developments
or influences originating from outside of the formal or constitution-
al structure) pressuring or constraining presidential decisions on ap-
pointments matters. The outside perspective is concerned with the
2. See RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE CONSTI-
TUTION 310-11, 324-25 (1996); CARTER, supra note 1, at 99-112.
3. For some notable exceptions, see HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS:
A POLITICAL HISTORY OF APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT (3d ed. 1992); JOSEPH
HARRIS, THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE: A STUDY OF THE CONFIRMATION
OF APPOINTMENTS BY THE UNITED STATES SENATE (1953); JOHN MASSARO, SUPREMELY
POLITICAL: THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY AND PRESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT IN UNSUCCESSFUL
SUPREME COURT NOMINATIONS (1990); Calvin R. Massey, Getting There: A Brief History
of the Politics of Supreme Court Appointments, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (1991).
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multi-layered, complex contexts in which presidential appointments
decisions are made.
The kinds of questions one asks in trying to explain or evalu-
ate presidential performance in the federal appointments process
depends on the perspective from which they are being asked. To
be sure, there is some overlap between the inside and outside
perspectives; fully developing both views leads one to consider the
fundamental question of how Presidents restructure their offices in
response to, as well as in anticipation of, social, economic, politi-
cal, and other outside developments or changes. The outside per-
spective leads one to ask such questions as what social, political,
and economic developments have shaped the presidency and presi-
dential performance in the appointments process (and how have
they done so); to what extent, if any, the relevant constitutional
structure matters and is still something with which we are generally
happy; whether the constitutional structure permits suitable account-
ability, allows for inappropriate or undesirable capture of appoint-
ments decisions by factions, and produces good or competent ap-
pointments (including a satisfactory fit between talent, ability, or
experience and the responsibilities of the offices being filled) and
an acceptable quality of discourse between the President and the
Senate; and whether the President or the Senate wields too much
or too little power on appointments matters. The inside perspective
leads one to ask such questions as why or how particular nomina-
tions were made, why certain nominations succeeded or failed,
what has been the nature of presidential-senatorial interaction over
appointments decisions generally or in particular cases, how the
relationship between Presidents and Senators on appointment mat-
ters compares with presidential and senatorial activities in other
areas, and how different Presidents have organized their administra-
tions on appointments matters.
This paper attempts to sketch the answers to some of the
questions raised by the inside perspective. In earlier works, I have
tried to argue that the confirmation process is a crucial forum for a
serious dialogue between the President and the Senate on not just
the merits of particular nominations or appointments but also relat-
ed constitutional and policy matters.4 In other works, I explore in
4. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Divided Justice: A Commentary on the Nomination and
Confirmation of Supreme Court Justices, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 969 (1992); Michael J.
Gerhardt, Interpreting Bork, 75 CoRumL L. REv. 1358, 1386-91 (1990).
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some detail the outside perspective on the appointments process.'
Although the focus of the present paper on the inside perspective
is, admittedly, somewhat limited in scope, I do not intend to argue
for either an imperial presidency or presidential dominance of the
federal appointments process.
Instead, I hope to lay some of the groundwork for understand-
ing presidential performance in the federal appointments process,
including the significance of the degree to which a President's
exercise of his appointment power facilitates his achievement of
certain constitutional and policy objectives.
Moreover, as Professor Tulis suggests, the federal appoint-
ments process is an important venue in which the President and the
Senate are able to and often do discuss or disagree about related
constitutional and policy issues,6 the relative scope of authority in
shared areas of responsibility, or the requisite qualifications for
certain positions. The President is a full partner in these dialogues.
Neither the presidency nor the Senate should be left out of the
equation when the goal is to assess comprehensively the operations
of the federal appointments process. Professor Tulis has reminded
us about the potential magnitude of the role that the Constitution
contemplates for the Senate to play in the federal appointments
process, while my aim is to is take an important, initial step in the
effort to provide some systematic analysis and clarification of the
President's role in the same system. This step entails explaining the
process from the inside-out (i.e., from the vantage point of those
acting as or on behalf of a President).
Providing this perspective should help to improve comprehen-
sion of different presidential understandings of their authority in
this arena, different presidential organizations for formulating ap-
pointments decisions and strategies, and the various factors facilitat-
ing or impeding presidential achievements of their objectives in this
process. In constructing this perspective, both history and political
science are extremely useful disciplines, the latter because it helps
to inform our judgments, analyses, and understanding of how insti-
tutions such as the presidency and the Senate take shape and oper-
5. See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PRocEss (forthcoming);
Michael J. Gerhardt, A Comprehensive Theory of the Federal Appointments Process,
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y (forthcoming 1997).
6. See Jeffrey K. Tulis, Constitutional Abdication: The Senate, the President, and
Appointments to the Supreme Court, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1331, 1338-39 (1997).
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ate, the former because it is the repository of comparative data,
including over two hundred years' worth of meaningful examples,
demonstrations, and analogies of presidential performance in the
venue of appointments. In drawing on both of these disciplines for
purposes of this paper, I aim to flesh out the story of how Presi-
dents interact with the Senate on appointments matters.
The story, as I see it, has several parts, each of which in-
cludes a basic principle indispensable to the understanding and
evaluation of presidential performance in the federal appointments
process. The first basic principle, discussed in Part I of this paper,
is that comprehensive clarification of the context is indispensable
for both understanding and evaluating the operations of the federal
appointments process. Elucidating the historical, political, economic,
and social contexts in which Presidents and Senators make deci-
sions on appointments matters helps to explain the external forces
vying to influence or control Presidents, or to which Presidents are
reacting in the appointments process, or that Presidents are trying
to control in or through this system. Further, clarifying such con-
texts also helps to explain the system's internal dynamics or opera-
tions, including the motivations and strategies of key participants.
The second basic principle, explored in Part II, is that the
conventional means for explaining and evaluating presidential per-
formance in the appointments process in strictly personal terms has
some important advantages but significant, generally overlooked
limitations. Although personalizing presidential performance in the
federal appointments process helps to illuminate the relevance of
some Presidents' personal characteristics to their actions within the
system, this approach fails to assess how the institution of the
presidency, particularly with respect to its responsibility for federal
appointments, has changed over time, because both the nature of
the institution and the necessary skills for leading it are not the
focus of a personal approach. Nor does personalizing the system
provide useful means for comparing presidential performance on
appointments matters in different historical periods because it dis-
misses any differences as resulting from personal quirks.
The third basic principle, considered in Part III, is that institu-
tional analysis is crucial for ensuring comprehensive understanding
and evaluation of presidential performance in the appointments
process. Institutional analysis requires assessing a President in
terms of the quality of his management of the institution of the
presidency, including his coordination of his nominating power
136319971
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with his exercise of other executive powers for the purpose of
facilitating his achievement of certain constitutional and policy
objectives. The latter conceivably includes changing the institution
of the presidency itself, the distribution of power among the three
branches of the federal government, or the relative balance of
power between the national and state governments. Moreover,
understanding presidential performance in the appointments process
in institutional terms helps to clarify the external and internal fac-
tors cutting across different historical periods that have influenced
the performance of different Presidents in different historical peri-
ods in the federal appointments process.
In the final analysis, it might not be possible to develop a
comprehensive understanding and evaluation of the President's role
in the federal appointments process without also developing a com-
plete theory of the operations of the federal government. This is
because a President's activities in this system are inextricably
linked to everything else that he does or is expected to do. Never-
theless, the effort to construct the inside perspective on presidential
activity in the federal appointments process (i.e., how Presidents
have used or structured their nominating power and coordinated it
with their other powers) is an important step on the path to devel-
oping more comprehensive explanation and evaluation of presiden-
tial leadership generally and of presidential-Senate interaction over
issues of mutual concern to them.
I. THE INDISPENSABILITY OF CLEAR CONTEXT
Clarifying comprehensively the context in which appointments
matters arise is crucial for fully explaining the operations or dy-
namics of the federal appointments process generally and in partic-
ular cases. First, defining context helps to reveal the changes, de-
velopments, or movements in society or the polity that a President
is trying to control or to which he is reacting in the course of
exercising his appointment authority. In other words, context is
indispensable for developing a coherent outside perspective on the
federal appointments process. Indeed, fully examining the historical,
social, political, and economic contexts in which Presidents have
operated helps to clarify the various forces that have shaped the
institution of the presidency (and presidential decisions on federal
appointments), including but not limited to the growth and partial
demise of political parties, the rise of interest groups and the phe-
nomenon of identity politics (or the tendency of voters to vote for
1364 [Vol. 47:1359
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or against candidates depending on whether the latter are closely
identified or associated with causes, issues, or symbols with which
they approve or dislike), and the proliferation of mass communica-
tions technology.7 In the course of trying to deal with these differ-
ent forces, Presidents have had to be both pro-active and reactive
in defining or wielding their respective powers (with, of course,
mixed results) and consequently have helped, along with these
external influences, to transform the presidency in ways that have
little to do with the formal structure but must still be understood
for full and fair evaluation of presidential decision-making on ap-
pointments.
Moreover, context helps to clarify the internal dynamics of the
federal appointments process, including a President's strategies and
organization for making appointments and interaction with the
Senate and other major players routinely involved in appointments
matters. The interaction among these different actors often leads to
or includes informal arrangements or accommodations that must
also be understood for a full assessment of the efficacy or limits of
the relevant constitutional structure.
A few examples should help to illustrate this basic point.
First, the social, political, and historical context in which the de-
cline in the political discourse between the President and the Sen-
ate on Supreme Court nominations, mentioned by Professor Tulis,
is revealing.' A critical factor is that the size and scope of the
authority of the national government has grown enormously, partic-
ularly over the past six decades. As the range of responsibility for
the national government has grown, Congress has created more
executive, quasi-executive, independent, and judicial offices requir-
ing presidential nomination and Senate confirmation. As these
offices have grown in number, so too has the President's supervi-
sory and administrative authority, for he has had the primary duty
for both choosing the people occupying them and overseeing their
actions.9
7. For detailed discussions of how these and other forces have shaped the modem
presidency, see Martin Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE LJ. 1725
(1996); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94
COLuM. L. REV. 1 (1994).
8. See Tulis, supra note 6.
9. See CAss R. SuNsTEN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 336 (1993); 1 BRUCE A.
ACKERIAN, WE TmE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 105-08 (1991).
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This growth has surely had an impact on the Senate's capabil-
ity and willingness to assert itself aggressively in Supreme Court
confirmation proceedings. To be sure, Congress has authorized
much of this expansion through its authority to create new federal
offices. In doing so, Congress has preserved the Senate's preroga-
tive whenever possible to confirm or reject presidential nominees.
The more offices requiring confirmation created by Congress the
more chances Senators have had to consult with the President in
filling those positions and thus the more bargaining chips Senators
have had available to use in dealing with the President on appoint-
ments and related legislative matters. In other words, the potential
numbers of contestable nominations have expanded considerably,
and both the President and the Senate are fully aware of this ex-
pansion. While the Senate has not rejected or otherwise blocked
Supreme Court nominations to the same degree in this century as it
did in the previous one," far more presidential nominations are
potentially available for one or more Senators to oppose because of
differences with the nominee's or President's constitutional or poli-
cy opinions." As a practical matter, Senators largely occupy a
defensive posture in the confirmation process, so that it is difficult,
if not impossible, for them to oppose all presidential nominations
and still expect to keep the federal government operating effective-
ly or to maintain credibility in claiming a purely nonpartisan moti-
vations for their actions. Consequently, Senators are forced to pick
and choose their confirmation fights with the President carefully.
Substantial exchanges often occur between Presidents and Senators
(particularly those in leadership positions or from the President's
party or both) behind closed doors and in public over the appropri-
ate people to nominate to certain, high-profile, influential positions
as well as after formal nominations have been made to those offic-
es. Consequently, the interference, particularly over the past two
decades, has extended to increased opposition to, forced withdraw-
als of, and rejections of many presidential nominations to offices
10. In this century, 11% of Supreme Court nominations (7 out of 61) have failed thus
far. See ABRAHAM, supra note 3, at 359. This contrasts rather dramatically with the fail-
ure rate of 29% (20 out of 70) in the nineteenth century. See TRIBE, supra note 1, at
142-47. In the eighteenth century, the failure rate was 12% (2 out of 17). See ABRAHAM,
supra note 3, at 76.
11. See generally James D. King & James W. Riddlesperger, Jr., Senate Confirmation
of Appointments to the Cabinet and Executive Office of the President, 28 Soc. Scl. J.
189, 192-95 (1991).
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involving many policy areas of keen concern both to the voting
public and to the best organized, financed interest groups. The
latter areas include national security, 2 the environment, econom-
ics, and civil rights. 3 Not insignificantly, the increasing number of
disputes over nominees to positions in these areas has coincided
with some (but by no means complete) abdication of authority by
Senators in Supreme Court confirmation hearings. 4 Moreover, the
12. For instance, it is noteworthy that over the past couple of decades some of the
most intense confirmation contests have involved nominees to some of the nation's most
sensitive national security posts. In 1977, Theodore Sorenson withdrew his nomination by
President Carter to head the Central Intelligence Agency "in the wake of assertions that
he lacked experience, was a pacifist, and had used secret documents in writing about the
Kennedy administration." CARTER, supra note 1, at 8. In 1987, President Reagan's nomi-
nation of Robert Gates, then Acting Director of the CIA, to become the full-time director
foundered fatally, because of unanswered questions involving his involvement in some of
the events leading up to the so-called Iran-Contra scandal. Four years later, the Senate
confirmed President Bush's nomination of Gates to head the agency but only after a
highly contentious confirmation hearing that left the appointee politically weakened. In
1989, the Senate rejected President Bush's nomination of former senator John Tower to
become Secretary of Defense based on concerns about his reported drinking and womaniz-
ing. See id. In 1994, Bobby Ray Inman, President Clinton's choice to replace Les Aspin
as Secretary of Defense, withdrew his nomination after "accus[ing] a syndicated columnist
of conspiring with Senate Republicans to sabotage his candidacy." Id. In 1997, George
Tenet became the fifth person nominated by President Clinton to head the CIA in four
years. See Tim Weiner, Clinton Picks Acting CIA Boss to Run Agency, PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland), Mar. 20, 1997, at Al. Tenet received the nomination in the wake of Anthony
Lake's withdrawal of his own nomination to head the agency after some influential Re-
publican senators' had delayed the Senate vote on his confirmation indefinitely. Their
delay was based on their concerns about his management record as President Clinton's
National Security Adviser and possible involvement in dubious fundraising activities on
behalf of the administration. See Tim Weiner, Lake Pulls Out as C.I.A. Nominee, N.Y.
TIMEs, Mar. 18, 1997, at Al. Lake would have succeeded John Deutsch, who had been
confirmed as the head of the agency after Michael Cams withdrew his nomination to
head the agency in 1995. Cams' withdrawal came on the heels of reports that he had
violated immigration laws to hire a Filipino servant. See id.
13. See generally King & Riddlesperger, supra note 11, at 192-99.
14. Professor Tulis criticizes the quality of the dialogue, particularly in the latter half
of the twentieth century, between the president and senators in the confirmation process.
His concern is that the dialogue has degenerated substantially and the senators have be-
come increasingly preoccupied with petty, partisan bickering rather than with grander
political considerations in making confirmation decisions. It is important to understand,
however, that the nature of the dialogue between presidents and senators throughout
American history has followed largely similar patterns. In another article, I both identify
and analyze this phenomenon. See Michael J. Gerhardt, A Comprehensive Theory of the
Federal Appointments Process, HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y (forthcoming 1997). As a de-
scriptive matter, the reasons presidents have made and senators have supported or opposed
various nominations have remained relatively constant throughout American history.
Presidents have made decisions about federal appointments based on their respective
calculations of various long- and short-term considerations. The long-term factors have
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House and the Senate each have had other means to check presi-
dential appointees, regardless of whether the latter have been sub-
ject to the Senate's confirmation authority. Particularly important
among these has been Congress' oversight and appropriations au-
thorities, which have been extended to virtually every aspect of the
executive branch.'
5
Another revealing example about the importance of context is
President Lincoln's nomination of Samuel Freeman Miller to the
Supreme Court. Professor Tulis cites this appointment as a good
example of the Senate's energetic assertion of its constitutional role
in the appointment of Supreme Court justices. 6 Yet, the context
of the appointment demonstrates that it was not simply a case of
presidential passivity or Senate aggression. On the one hand, Presi-
dent Lincoln's exercise of his appointment authority, throughout his
time in office, was influenced by extraordinary external pressures,
including the needs to manage and ultimately to win the Civil
War, to keep the Union together, and to nurture and keep unified
his fledgling political party, including the coalition that brought
entailed a nominee's philosophy about the role of the national government in American
society and the relationship between the different branches of the federal government,
while the short-term factors have included a nominee's political party, chances for confir-
mation, domicile, age, and benefactors or supporters. Both long- and short-term concerns
have depended on political circumstances, the state of presidential-Senate relations, and
presidents' and senators' other priorities and ambitions for the federal office being filled.
Moreover, presidents have differed from senators in the ways in which they have
combined these different factors and the sequence in which they have taken these con-
cerns into account. For example, in deciding on a set of suitable candidates for a con-
firmable post, presidents have tended to be guided by grander rather than baser political
concerns, such as objective merit, commitment to a particular constitutional philosophy or
vision, or the long-term relations between the federal and state governments or between
federal institutions. In making a choice from within this set, however, presidents have
been disposed to be guided by pragmatic concerns, such as ease of confirmation, the
ramifications for their popularity, party loyalty, or the need to appease certain constituen-
cies. Presidents have tended to differ, depending on their relative mixes of long- and
short-term considerations in making appointments. In contrast, in the Senate, opposition to
a nomination initially develops for partisan or even personal reasons; the opposition gener-
ally succeeds, however, only if it can be framed in terms of some grander political fac-
tors, including the preservation of certain constitutional ideals such as federalism.
As a normative matter, one can assess presidents and senators based on their relative
or respective mixes of long- and short-term political objectives. The more weighted
decisions are made in favor of grander concerns the greater challenges their implementa-
tion is likely to face (and, hence, the greater the achievement of implementing them),
because grander concerns are likelier to make bigger targets and require the marshaling of
greater forces or widespread political and public support for their implementation.
15. See King & Riddlesperger, supra note 11, at 199.
16. See Tulis, supra note 6, at 1353.
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him into office. None of these were small matters; each required
considerable time, attention, and energy. He was not inclined to
jeopardize any of these at the time the vacancy to which Miller
was ultimately nominated arose.
On the other hand, President Lincoln understood the stakes
involved in Supreme Court nominations, and he had his own crite-
ria for selecting them, including geographic suitability (as was true
for all nineteenth and early twentieth century Presidents), loyalty to
the party and to the preservation of the Union and the Constitution,
opposition to slavery, and professional ability or judicial experi-
ence. 7 By all accounts, Miller easily met these criteria. Moreover,
Miller enjoyed the support of virtually all Western governors and
the entire western delegation in Congress as well as a unique con-
gressional petition containing the names of 129 out of 140 mem-
bers of the House and all but four Senators. This unprecedented
lobbying effort, which would never again be matched in size or
intensity in American history, grabbed Lincoln's attention.'" Nev-
ertheless, the effort was made on behalf of a person whose creden-
tials were impeccable and whose constitutional views were fully
consistent with those the President sought for Supreme Court nomi-
nees. In the end, the choice of Miller was remarkably straightfor-
ward, for it fully satisfied the short- and long-term interests of both
the President and Congress.
President Lincoln took a different tack in finding a replace-
ment for Chief Justice Roger Taney, who died in October 1864
shortly before the presidential election. President Lincoln deliber-
ately postponed announcing his choice until after his reelection
campaign was over. By then, the circumstances for making the
nomination were different than those that existed at the time of
17. See ABRAHAM, supra note 3, at 117.
18. Only two other instances of such assertive congressional support have occurred in
American history. The first happened in 1869, when a large majority of both the House
of Representatives and the Senate signed a petition urging President Ulysses Grant to
nominate President Lincoln's Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton to the Supreme Court.
Although President Grant did so, Stanton died four days after having been confimned by
the Senate. See id. at 127-28. The second episode occurred in 1932, when law school
deans and labor and business leaders strongly urged President Herbert Hoover to nominate
then-New York Court of Appeals Judge Benjamin Cardozo to the Supreme Court. Presi-
dent Hoover eventually acquiesced but only after having been pressured to do the same
by the then-powerful Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, William Borah of
Idaho. See TRIBE, supra note 1, at 97-98.
19. See generally DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINCoLN 536-52 (1995).
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Justice Miller's appointment. The Union's prospects for winning
the Civil War had improved, and the President had received a solid
majority of support for his reelection bid. Although the President
retained his same selection criteria for the Court, he had the addi-
tional concern that the Republican party had suffered some signifi-
cant losses in the 1864 congressional elections and needed serious
mending. Although the President preferred to nominate his long-
time friend and political ally, Postmaster General Montgomery
Blair, Lincoln had some doubts about the latter's ability to unify
disparate groups within the Republican party. Instead, after eight
weeks of deliberation, President Lincoln settled on his former Trea-
sury Secretary and longtime political rival, Salmon Chase, because
"first, he had no doubt that Chase's policy views on the war and
future reconstruction were sound and reliable[;] second, if anyone
could heal the widening breach in the Republican party, it would
be Chase[; and] third, Chase [had] campaigned hard and effectively
for Lincoln's [re]election."2 Whereas the broader list of potential
candidates for Chief Justice was based on a variety of significant
factors including constitutional philosophy and commitment to the
preservation of the Union and Lincoln's reconstruction policies, the
President chose Chase because Chase could satisfy better than any
other possible nominee both those concerns and the immediate,
important need to keep the Republican party unified.
President Lincoln's concerns about keeping both the Union
together and the Republican party unified also influenced his non-
judicial appointments. Of course, in his first term the outside pres-
sures competing for his time and attention and constraining or
imposing challenges on his exercise of presidential powers were the
same as those he had to confront in nominating Justice Miller, and
the inside pressures were almost identical, with a few exceptions.
For one thing, the President made patronage appointments for
people who had assisted his presidential campaigns.2' Moreover,
20. ABRAHAM, supra note 3, at 123. See also DONALD, supra note 19, at 552 ("[Li-
ncoln] chose Chase to be Chief Justice because he thought him worthy-but he expected
to receive political advantages from his choice. The appointment was part of the broader
program of conciliating all the factions within the Republican party.").
21. See HARRIS, supra note 3, at 72. Interestingly, Lincoln had signaled earlier in his
career the kind of approach he thought a president should take in making federal appoint-
ments. Lincoln had strongly urged President Zachary Taylor, on behalf of whose election
he had tirelessly worked, to take party loyalty and service seriously into account in
awarding significant federal appointments. See DONALD, supra note 19, at 138.
1370 [Vol. 47:1359
APPOINTMENTS PERSPECTIVE
his agenda for his first term was to put less emphasis on appoint-
ing people personally loyal to him and more emphasis on acknowl-
edging and rewarding party leaders instrumental to his initial elec-
tion as President, maintaining political support for his administra-
tion, and the success of his reelection campaign. Consequently,
President Lincoln brought into his administration some of his most
ardent political rivals, who were then put in the uncomfortable
positions of either doing his bidding as President or appearing to
be disloyal to his administration or the Union. President Lincoln
often, but not always, deferred to his cabinet secretaries in their
choices of subordinates, so that it was not unusual for the former
to choose their most loyal followers to serve under them. The
disadvantage of this practice was that it resulted in the choice of a
cabinet in his first term that was doomed from the start to lack
harmony and loyalty to him.'
In his second term, the President took a different tack in
making high-level, non-judicial appointments in part because his
support from the American people and the prospects for keeping
the Union together and resolving the Civil War favorably appeared
to be stronger. As Professor David Herbert Donald has suggested:
In contrast to the members of the original cabinet, none of
these appointees was a major party leader and none had
aspirations for the presidency. Lincoln now felt so strong
that he did not have to surround himself with the heads of
the warring Republican factions. He did not require ideo-
logical conformity of the men he chose .... The President
did not want his cabinet members to be rubber stamps, and
he was supremely confident of his ability to handle dis-
agreement among his advisers. Unlike his original cabinet,
his new appointees-like his holdovers, [William] Seward
[as Secretary of State], [Edwin] Stanton [as Secretary of
War], and [Gideon] Welles [as Navy Secretary]-were
warmly attached to Lincoln personally. He could now af-
ford the luxury of a loyal cabinet.'
As the external and internal pressures changed during President
Lincoln's time in office, so did his strategy for dealing with them.
No doubt, Lincoln's coordination of various presidential powers,
22. See DONALD, supra note 19, at 267.
23. Id. at 551.
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including his appointment authority, to deal with virtually unparal-
leled challenges and to facilitate his (and the country's) achieve-
ment of certain constitutional and political objectives, is the hall-
mark of his presidency. To fully appreciate why this is so, it is
necessary to do more than just to describe the historical, political,
or social contexts in which Lincoln--or, for that matter, any Presi-
dent-has acted. Context helps to elucidate the challenges confront-
ing the different actors involved in the federal appointments pro-
cess, but it does not suggest the appropriate ways for measuring
how well different Presidents operating under different circumstanc-
es and in different time periods deal with the internal and external
difficulties confronting them. The next steps, undertaken in Parts II
and H, are to develop useful or meaningful criteria for evaluating
presidential performance within different historical, social, and
political contexts.
II. THE LIMrATIONS OF A PERSONALIZED EVALUATION
Constitutional scholars have not yet fully developed useful
criteria for evaluating presidential performance in the federal ap-
pointments process. This exercise is primarily a normative one; it
aims to develop standards for evaluating presidential contributions
and performances in the appointments process rather than just to
define context or explain some past events. This exercise is crucial
for making comparative judgments about presidential performances
that cut across different historical periods.
Most commentators have tended to personalize the confirmation
process. This approach is quite natural, for the dominant focus of
the appointments process is usually on the fate of a single per-
son-the nominee. Moreover, the often dramatic conflicts that arise
between Presidents and Senators over a nominee's fate shed con-
siderable light on their respective priorities, temperaments, political
skills, allegiances, and personal values. In our federal system, the
choices a President makes in the people he nominates to critical
positions provide significant insights into his personal priorities,
including the persons on whose advancement he prefers to spend
political coinage.24 Similarly, Senators reveal a great deal about
24. See RICHARD TANNER JOHNSON, MANAGING THE WHITE HOUSE: AN INTIMATE
STUDY OF THE PRESIDENCY xx (1974); see also ROBERT SCIGLIANO, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE PRESIDENCY 148-57 (1971) (discussing how different presidents' Supreme
Court appointments have reflected their personal values and partisan affiliations).
1372 [Vol. 47:1359
APPOINTMENTS PERSPECTIVE
themselves (things often hidden from public view in the absence of
such proceedings) in the midst of intensely contested confirmation
proceedings.2
The temptation is intense to draw on personal angles to explain
particular incidents in the federal appointments process. Conse-
quently, some choices, such as President John Kennedy's selection
of his brother Robert as his Attorney General, make the most sense
in terms of the close personal ties and trust shared by the two.' 6
Moreover, in the case of a failed nomination, a President is made
singularly responsible for the outcome. For instance, the failure of
the Robert Bork nomination is frequently blamed in part on Presi-
dent Reagan's delay in coming to the defense of his embattled
Supreme Court nominee,' while President Clinton took the blame
for having nominated Lani Guinier, a friend from law school,
without having read her legal scholarship.' In still other cases, a
President's support for a nominee in spite of the damage it causes
him can be explained in terms of stubbornness, as with Nixon's
sticking to his Supreme Court nominee Harold Carswell in spite of
widespread condemnation,29 or loyalty to his allies, as with
George Bush's willingness to stand by his embattled nominees
John Tower (as Secretary of Defense)" and Clarence Thomas (as
Associate Justice).3 Similar depictions have been used to explain
Senators' actions, as with the portrayals of many Republican Sena-
tors as being vicious, ignorant, or sexist based on their ardent
defense of Clarence Thomas or questioning of Anita Hill.32
25. See Ronald Dworkin, One Year Later, The Debate Goes On, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25,
1992, § 7, at I (noting that the Thomas hearings "taught us much about the character of
some of our most prominent officials."); Steven V. Roberts, In Confirmation Process,
Hearings Offer a Stage, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1989, § B, at 7 (describing the ways in
which senators' performances in confirmation hearings reflect their personalities and agen-
das); Henry P. Monaghan, The Confirmation Process: Law or Politics?, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1202, 1207 n.21 (1988) (suggesting that a senator's decision is the result of the
tension between political self-interest and personal principles).
26. See STEPHEN HESS, ORGANIZING THE PRESIDENCY 81, 171 (1976).
27. See, e.g., ETHAN BRONNER, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE: How THE BORK NOMINATION
SHOOK AMERICA 160, 202-03 (1989).
28. See Maureen Dowd, In 1994-Model Politics, Loyalty is Often Optional Equipment,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1994, § 4, at 3.
29. Cf. ABRAHAM, supra note 3, at 15-19.
30. See Michael Oreskes, Bush's Man and Mandate on the Line, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26,
1989, § 4, at 1.
31. See TIMOTHY M. PHELPS & HELEN WINTERNn-z, CAPrrOL GAMES 138, 305 (1992).
32. See, e.g., JANE MAYER & JILL ABRAMSON, STRANGE JUSTICE: THE SELLING OF
CLARENCE THOMAS 351-54 (1994).
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Characterizing the confirmation process in personal terms clear-
ly has implications for the criteria employed to evaluate the perfor-
mance of the President or the Senate in the federal appointments
process. Under this approach, Presidents are made personally re-
sponsible for every action or decision made in their name or on
behalf of those (such as the nominee) aligned with them. More-
over, performance is measured in terms of personal traits or quali-
ties, such as intelligence, popularity, charisma, strength of character
or conviction, loyalty, stubbornness, ambition, or political acuity.33
Hence, in evaluating presidential performance in the appointments
process, many people might ask about how well Presidents knew
the people whom they were nominating to particular posts, whether
Presidents made intelligent choices on which people to nominate or
which people's advice to follow, to whom a President felt indebt-
ed, whether a President had strong convictions (and, if so, regard-
ing what), what benefits a President received from making a partic-
ular appointment, what price(s) a President paid for certain success-
ful or failed nominations, whether Presidents were sufficiently or
perhaps too loyal, to what extent a President's stubbornness or
anger influenced his actions in the appointments process, or how
well a President understood or handled the state of his relations
with the Senate. 4
Perhaps the most sophisticated version of personalizing the
federal appointments process is game theory. It helps to assess
performance as strategic behavior. At the risk of some oversimplifi-
33. See, e.g., JAMES DAVID BARBER, THE PRESIDENTIAL CHARACTER: PREDICTING
PERFORMANCE IN THE WHITE HOUSE (2d ed. 1977) (arguing that presidential character
heavily influences performance in office); HENRY C. KENSKi, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS?
THE GUARDIAN PRESIDENT AND HIS PUBLIC, IN LEADERSHIP AND THE BUSH PRESIDENCY:
PRUDENCE OR DRIFT IN AN ERA OF CHANGE? 91 (Ryan J. Barilleaux & Mary E. Stuckey
eds., 1992) (discussing the importance of public approval and popularity as a measure of
presidential success). Cf. Michael Fitts, The Paradox of Power in the Modern State: Why
a Unitary, Centralized Presidency May Not Exhibit Effective or Legitimate Leadership, 144
U. PA. L. REV. 827, 872 (1996) (claiming that because the public assessment of presiden-
tial performance is based on "a standard of moral assessment appropriate for individuals,
rather than for institutions," presidential power is undermined); see also BARBARA
HINCKLEY, BEYOND REFORM, IN THE PRESIDENCY IN AMERICAN POL11ICS 105 (P. Brace,
C.B. Harrington, & G. King eds., 1989) (examining the link between presidential perfor-
mance and public perceptions of the President).
34. It is important to understand that the President is not the only actor whose perfor-
mance in the federal appointments process has been understood or evaluated in personal
terms. It is also quite common for political scientists and particularly legal scholars to
treat senators in a similar manner (i.e., to ask about senators' backgrounds, personal or
partisan loyalties, motivations, aptitudes, integrity, characters, temperaments, or convictions).
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cation, one could describe the federal appointments process as a
game of chicken with multiple iterations and players (as opposed
to its normal form with two players)." A good illustration of the
confirmation process as a game of chicken is President Bush's
nomination of Clarence Thomas to replace Justice Thurgood Mar-
shall on the Supreme Court. 6 President Bush dared Democrats,
who at the time had been criticizing his opposition to affirmative
action, to reject a conservative African-American nominee. Presi-
dent Bush gambled that at least the Southern Democrats would be
unable to oppose the nomination, regardless of the nominee's
views. Justice Thomas also played chicken with the Senate. He
dared it to ignore his moving life story and to reject him on the
basis of his weak and sometimes unbelievable testimony before the
Senate Judiciary Committee. Later, he played the race card by
denouncing the second phase of his hearings investigating Anita
Hill's charges of sexual harassment as a "high-tech lynching" and
thereby forcing his critics to prove their opposition was not rac-
ist. 7 The nomination and hearings damaged President Bush in part
because of his desire to charge ahead into some blind alleys that
resulted in harm to his credibility. Similarly, many Senators were
damaged because they too charged ahead into some of the same
blind alleys, seemingly oblivious to the risk they would look cow-
ardly rather than statesmanlike by deferring to the President's
choice of a weak but sympathetic nominee.
Another example of confirmation contests as a special game of
chicken is the process leading up to President Clinton's two Su-
preme Court nominations. In both cases, each side engaged in
extensive maneuvering to influence the choice of a nominee and to
engineer a confirmation hearing that would help its image and
agenda. 8 Along the way, both sides leaked information to the
press strategically to influence the choice of a nominee and the
ultimate confirmation decision. 9 Sometimes the leaks came from
35. See generally D. BAIRD, R. GERTNER, & R. PICKER, GAME THMORY AND THE LAW
44 (1994).
36. See Gerhardt, Divided Justice, supra note 4, at 969, 976-77.
37. See The Thomas Nomination: Excerpts from Senate's Hearings on the Thomas
Nomination, N.Y. TiMEs, Oct. 12, 1991, at A12.
38. See generally Sheldon Goldman, Judicial Selection under Clinton: A Midterm Ex-
amination, 78 JUDICATURE 276, 277-78 (1995).
39. See Paul Richter, Clinton Takes More Time on Court Choice, L.A. TIMPS, May 13,
1994, § A, at 4; Carl M. Cannon & Nelson Schwartz, Clinton's 'Trial Balloon' Strategy
Tends to Burst, Ctl. SUN-TIMES, June 22, 1993; Holly Idelson, Clinton Closes in on a
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within the same camp, as with the many rumors from within the
Clinton administration on likely nominees. These rumors were
designed to keep Senators off guard, test other possible nominees,
pressure the President to support or oppose certain possible nomi-
nees, or even to gain momentum or build support within the ad-
ministration itself for or against a particular nomination. In the end,
both sides got something but neither gets the biggest possible pay-
off. As game theory suggests, the biggest payoff occurs when
survival depends on one side's choosing not to flinch in the face
of confrontation with the other and the former does not falter;
when both parties flinch and prefer to avoid damage, neither gets
the biggest possible payoff.'
Game theory is not without its limitations. The dynamics of the
federal appointments process are much too complex to be captured
accurately within the simple terms of a single game. Moreover,
neither the President nor the Senate is monolithic or unified in its
operations. In terms of their internal operations, the presidency and
the Senate are structured differently, with the former functioning as
a hierarchy with a single executive at the top but with substantial
staff underneath and the Senate operating as a multi-membered
body in which the members each formally has a single vote in the
process but each does not wield equal influence within the body or
with the President. Consequently, Presidents and Senators do not
come at things in precisely the same manner. In addition, decisions
about federal appointments are not the province of a single person
or branch; formally the process involves the President and the
Senate, but in practice the federal appointments process has en-
tailed or depended to varying degrees on the participation of not
just those political actors but also the general public, interest
groups, the media, and the nominee, to name just the most promi-
nent players potentially involved. No game can assess the interac-
Nominee; Choices Winnowed to Two, 51 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1482, 1485 (1993).
40. A confirmation skirmish could also be described as a special game of tit-for-tat.
See generally BAIRD, E. AL, supra note 35, at 171-72, 174, 316. Tit-for-tat is an "infi-
nitely repeated game," id. at 316, with cooperation as its ultimate goal but played in a
potentially unending series of periods in each of which one player tries to cooperate while
the other is retaliating for wrong done in a previous period. See id. at 171-72. Numerous
confirmation contests could be explained in terms of this game, including but not limited
to the forced withdrawals of Zoe Baird and Lani Guinier, see, e.g., Dowd supra note 28,
and the Senate's rejections of both Clement Haynesworth and Harold Carswell. See Paul
Freund, Appointment of Justices: Some Historical Perspectives, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1146,
1155 (1988).
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tion between all or some of these players fully or even within a
single appointments matter. Consequently, another analysis is re-
quired to ensure comprehensive measurement of the dynamics of
presidential and senatorial interaction in the confirmation process.
H. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
Personalizing the federal appointments process is of limited
utility in explaining and evaluating the performances of different
Presidents from different historical periods in the federal appoint-
ments process. The problems are that it ignores the significance of
presidential efforts to manage and shape both the institution of the
presidency, including its authority relating to the making of federal
appointments, and dismisses any differences in presidential perfor-
mance in the federal appointments process as a function of differ-
ent personal traits, values, or quirks.'
It behooves us to remember that Presidents and Senators are
more than the people who occupy certain federal offices; they are
also the leaders of powerful governmental institutions, and they act
as such when they operate within the federal appointments process.
Moreover, they do not try to manage these institutions in a vacu-
um; Presidents operate in different social, economic, historical, and
political contexts. Presidents must react to various kinds of devel-
opments or movements within both government and society at
large. The presidency is not static; its responsibilities and structure
have evolved over the course of American history. Consequently,
no study of presidential performance within the federal appoint-
ments process would be complete without assessing the relationship
between such performance and changes within the office or powers
of the presidency (and the reasons for those changes).
The challenges of leading or managing the institution of the
presidency, including defining and coordinating its various powers,
require a different set of criteria for evaluating performance than
those suggested by an approach grounded in personal traits or
character.42 In the next two sections, I explore (a), the kinds of
41. Nor does personalizing the system adequately explain the consistent patterns in
presidential and senatorial decision-making on appointments in different historical periods.
42. In this part, I primarily discuss the presidency from the inside perspective. This
discussion is just one step in a larger effort to understand and evaluate presidential per-
formance in the federal appointments process. A comprehensive discussion should also
include careful consideration, which I intend to undertake in future writing on this topic,
of several other questions such as the degree to which the presidency has been shaped or
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critical measurements of presidential leadership required by institu-
tional analysis, including perhaps most significantly the relative
quality of a President's coordination of his appointing authority
with his other executive powers for the purpose of achieving the
objectives of greatest importance to him, and (b), some of the po-
tential challenges that a President needs to be prepared to confront
or take into consideration in the course of trying to satisfy such
measurements.
A. The Implications of Institutional Analysis
Every President faces a peculiar combination of external and
internal challenges in the course of trying to put his own individual
stamp on the office of the presidency-if not also on the Constitu-
tion and the nation's course in history. Some of the external chal-
lenges have included, inter alia: world wars; governmental corrup-
tion; the need to appease certain constituencies pivotal to a
President's initial election or reelection; civil war; the institution of
slavery; the Depression; and the civil rights, labor, states' rights,
and popular sovereignty movements. The internal challenges have
included: the desire among powerful constituencies or supporters
within an administration to control its appointments or policies;
senatorial courtesy;43 ideological, policy, or personality disputes
among a President's advisers; and the pressure to negotiate with
Senate leaders or trade some choices for certain appointments for
critical support on certain legislative matters. The measure of a
President's performance is largely based on how well he has man-
aged--or marshalled the powers of his office to control-the par-
ticular combinations of challenges confronting him in the course of
trying to achieve certain long- and short-range objectives.' In the
influenced by other governmental or social institutions, forces, or interests.
43. Senatorial courtesy is the practice begun under President George Washington and
followed to varying degrees by all subsequent presidents. It involves presidential deference
to the choices of the senators (from his political party) of the people to nominate to
certain federal offices within their respective states. See generally HARRIS, supra note 3,
at 215-37.
44. Cf Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The Ultimate Approval Rating, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE,
Dec. 15, 1996, 50-51. Schlesinger notes:
To succeed, Presidents must have a port to seek and 'must convince Congress
and the electorate of the rightness of their course. Every President stands in
Theodore Roosevelt's "bully pulpit." National crisis widens his range of options
but does not automatically make the man. The crisis of rebellion did not spur
Buchanan to greatness, nor did the Depression turn Hoover into a bold and
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course of managing these challenges and pursuing their legislative
and other objectives, Presidents are called upon to develop or exer-
cise a variety of different management skills, including cultivating
and maintaining a good working relationship with the Senate; orga-
nizing or deploying judiciously and effectively the resources and
personnel of their office and administration; appreciating the full
range of executive powers and presidential authority; articulating
and implementing a clear constitutional vision and program; and
keenly understanding their time and place in history."
In his paradigm-shifting study of presidential performance,
46
Professor Stephen Skowronek has suggested that presidential lead-
ership should be measured in institutional terms or by whether a
President has been able to wield the powers of and resources avail-
able to his office to change in some relatively lasting fashion both
the Constitution's popular understanding and distribution of govern-
mental power and authority.47 Though Skowronek does not ana-
lyze how a President's nominating power should be evaluated in
institutional terms, it would follow from his general analysis that it
is another significant means for accomplishing a broader agenda. In
other words, a successful President would have to meet the rather
demanding test of using his appointment authority in ways that
have facilitated his achievement of the larger objectives Skowronek
has suggested are crucial for distinguishing presidential
leadership.'
Generally, Skowronek sets a very high threshold for presiden-
tial success (i.e., a President needs to be an activist who has both
articulated and implemented a broad vision of constitutional
change).49 The broader the vision implemented the greater the de-
imaginative leader. Their inadequacies in the face of crisis allowed Lincoln and
the second Roosevelt to show the difference that individuals can make to histo-
ry.
Id.
45. See generally STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLmcS PRESIDENTS MAKE: LEADERSHEP
FROM JOHN ADAMS TO GEORGE BUSH 28 (1993).
46. See id.
47. See id. at 21.
48. See id. at 28-29.
49. This measure of success does not turn on a normative evaluation of a president's
agenda. Success depends on articulating and implementing an agenda for changing consti-
tutional or governmental orderings, so that generally presidents who state as their primary
objectives the preservation of some (or perhaps all) of an existing order are destined to
be measured or graded less well under the applicable criteria. Under this criteria, it is
possible to conceive of President Lincoln, for instance, as doing nothing more than pre-
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gree of presidential success. Under this standard, very few Presi-
dents will rank high, and those who do are relatively easy to
guess, including Andrew Jackson and Abraham Lincoln in the
nineteenth century and Franklin Roosevelt in the twentieth century.
All three Presidents used every conceivable means, including feder-
al appointments, to implement their respective constitutional vi-
sions." These Presidents used their nominating power, along with
their other powers, to effect substantial, enduring constitutional
changes.
To some, this test might sound too demanding because it re-
quires a President to demand a lot more from his nominations than
just relatively easy confirmations or loyalty once they have been
confirned. Yet, that is precisely the point. Success is not difficult
to achieve if one merely lowers one's sights. Consequently, it is
possible to identify different levels of Presidents' success depend-
ing on the breadth of their vision or the scope of their ambition
for the nation (and subsequent success in fulfilling it).
Indeed, if success was measured strictly in terms of the per-
centages of a President's confirmned nominations, the figures would
be misleading. These statistics would be misleading partly because
the Constitution generally establishes a presumption of confirmation
by putting "a political burden on the Senate [that] makes it diffi-
serving the original Union, but this misperceives the nature and significance of Lincoln's
achievement. First, even if one were to think that Lincoln were simply trying to preserve
nothing more than the status quo, he faced challenges of unprecedented scope. Preserving
meaningful constitutional order under the conditions under which Lincoln operated required
extraordinary management skills. Lincoln, however, did more than that. He also "shat-
ter[ed] existing power arrangements" by ending slavery. Id. at 208. Under any credible
system of evaluation, Lincoln's accomplishment, coupled with the preservation of the
Union, has to be considered to be a truly remarkable feat.
To be sure, preserving an existing constitutional order under difficult circumstances is
a significant presidential accomplishment in its own right. For instance, one could argue
that one of President Clinton's primary objectives has been to protect both the New Deal
and the Great Society from being dismantled by the Republican Congress that came into
office during the mid-term elections of 1994. He could be scored high on these counts
for having accomplished his objectives, but not as well as the presidents who first put
these programs into effect. Moreover, he has done so by choosing not to turn some areas
into battlegrounds. Such has been the case with his judicial appointments, which have
largely been made to garner consensus. He has also sometimes purposely avoided articu-
lating a perfectly clear constitutional vision, so that he has left himself maneuvering room
for reelection and compromise. Perhaps nothing confirms more clearly the merits of his
strategy than his reelection to the presidency in 1996.
50. See SKOWRONEK, supra note 45, at 130-54 (Jackson), 198-207 (Lincoln), 288-324
(F.D. Roosevelt).
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cult [for the Senate] to successfully oppose a President of ordinary
political strength for narrow or partisan reasons."' The problem
for the Senate is that small factions typically cannot unravel or
stop a presidential nomination, in the absence of some special
Senate procedures empowering them to do so. Moreover, as a
collegial body, the Senate faces a substantial challenge in maintain-
ing a majority in opposition for a prolonged contest with the uni-
tary executive over the latter's choices to fill a confirmable post.
Also, the Senate's task is made more difficult because it occupies a
defensive posture in the appointments process in which it is largely
confined to exercising a veto. In addition, a high percentage of
successful confirmations could be explained as much by the lack as
by the presence of a clearly articulated, well-executed presidential
vision. The figures could conceivably reflect a President with no
ability or desire to withstand even the threat of opposition.
In effect, this means that the more weighted a President's cal-
culations of his objectives for his appointments are in the direction
of long-range governmental or constitutional change the greater his
chances for measuring highly in this area in terms of institutional
analysis. This does not necessarily mean that a President must
make bold appointments decisions but rather that the appointment
power be used in a manner inextricably linked to his achievement
of something bold in office. The more successful a President is in
implementing his vision through his appointments the more obsta-
cles through which he will have to maneuver the institution of the
presidency to realize his vision. Consequently, presidential perfor-
mance can be assessed in terms of the institutional objectives
sought, the obstacles confronting them, the strategy adopted or
skills employed for achieving the objectives or bypassing the obsta-
cles, and the goals actually achieved.
Andrew Jackson's record on federal appointments provides a
good illustration of how such assessment would work. Jackson
came into office riding the crest of a wave of democratic fervor
among the voting public. He dedicated his presidency in large part
to democratize the national government (i.e., to make it more re-
sponsive (and thus more accountable) to the common man).52 He
51. John McGinnis, The President, the Senate, and the Constitution, and the Confirma-
tion Process: A Reply to Professors Strauss and Sunstein, 71 TEX. L. REV. 633, 653
(1993).
52. See ARTHuR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF JACKSON 43 (1945).
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also came into office at a time when Congress claimed to be the
preeminent, most truly representative national institution. The m-
ovement, particularly in the South, in favor of states' rights was
gaining momentum; the national government, especially the execu-
tive branch, was suffering from unprecedented corruption; and his
political party was new and not yet fully stabilized nor established.
It was against this backdrop that Jackson served as President for
two terms from 1829-1837, during which he repeatedly vied with
Congress to establish the President as the only true national leader
(because of its status as the only federal official elected by all of
the American electorate). Thus, he set out to eliminate congres-
sional supremacy and to establish instead the supremacy of the
presidency as national policymaker. A significant portion of the
contest -was played out in the appointments process. Indeed, Jack-
son confronted an unprecedented number of confirmation con-
tests. 53 In his first year of office, the Senate thwarted ten of his
nominations, and in his first term it rejected Roger Taney
twice-once as Secretary of the Treasury and later as an Associate
Justice.54 Yet, in the end Jackson won far more contests than he
lost; his tenacity is evidenced by his repeated efforts to expand the
President's prerogative in filling national offices with his preferred
choices, to test the resolve of a majority of Senators to remain
organized in opposition to a string of well qualified nominees, and
willingness time and time again to test the popularity of his actions
(and his nominees and policies) against those of opposing Senators.
Moreover, President Jackson had to manage a struggle for
power within his administration for control of appointments. In-
deed, a palace struggle had been going on within the Jackson
administration from the moment Jackson announced his initial
cabinet selections. Vice President John Calhoun and Secretary of
State Martin Van Buren, who had been equal partners in forging
the victorious Jackson coalition, were vying with each other for
influence over key federal appointments and for Jackson's support
in naming a successor.55 Consequently, Jackson's initial cabinet
appointments had been based on such diverse factors as close
personal friendships and political expediency, thus they differed
widely in terms of quality and loyalty to him. Increasingly bitter
53. See HARRIS, supra note 3, at 53.
54. See id. at 58-62, 259-60.
55. See SKOWRONEK, supra note 45, at 137.
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and open conflicts between Jackson and Calhoun (and Calhoun's
allies within the administration) led Jackson eventually to purge his
cabinet of Calhoun supporters. 6 Jackson's second cabinet was a
marked improvement in terms of quality and loyalty to him and
his policies. Nevertheless, the struggle did not end with Jackson's
announcements of his reconfigured cabinet, for the Senate still had
to confirm its new members, and it stood waiting with some of
Jackson's most bitter political foes, including Henry Clay, Vice-
President Calhoun, and Daniel Webster, as members.
Jackson's foes wasted little time in trying to thwart some of
Jackson's key appointments, including rejecting President Jackson's
nomination of Martin Van Buren to become Minister to Great
Britain. The Senate had confirmed Van Buren only three months
before the latter nomination as Secretary of State, but the circum-
stances were had changed because of Jackson's open break with
Calhoun (and his supporters) and Jackson's designation of Van
Buren as his heir apparent. Calhoun retaliated by casting the deci-
sive vote against Van Buren's nomination as Minister to Great
Britain. Jackson turned defeat into victory by publicly extolling
Van Buren's virtues and blaming the latter's defeat on Jackson's
political enemies. Never doubtful of his popularity with a majority
of the electorate, Jackson decided to use the Senate's blatant parti-
sanship against it in the next presidential election. Thus, he named
Van Buren as his running mate to illustrate his faith in the latter's
abilities, and Van Buren later succeeded Jackson as President.57
Jackson's victory was not just a personal triumph; it reinforced his
claim of the presidency rather than the Congress as the branch
more representative of the will of the American people, and it
signaled widespread support for his efforts to reform the national
government and preserve the Union.
Whereas Jackson could boast significant confirmation victories
in the aftermath of intense struggles with the Senate, a President's
string of short-term successes within the federal appointments pro-
cess does not necessarily represent an achievement of lasting sig-
nificance. George Bush, for instance, won far more than he lost in
the federal appointments process (in part due to the presumption of
confirmation embodied in the constitutional structure), 8 but his
56. See ROBERT V. REMINI, THE LIFE OF ANDREW JACKSON 205-06 (1988).
57. See ROBERT V. REMINI, ANDREW JACKSON AND THE COURSE OF AMERICAN FREE-
DOM 1822-1832 345-52 (1981).
58. See generally Sheldon Goldman, Bush's Judicial Legacy: The Final Imprint, 76
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victories had little enduring value because they were made largely
on the basis of his perceived need to obtain short-term political
advantage rather than to implement a clearly conceived, articulated,
long-term constitutional or political vision.59 In all likelihood, the
absence of such a vision (particularly one that could easily be
identified as a unifying theme for his presidency) spelled doom for
the Bush presidency insofar as both the voters were and future
historians remain concerned.
Nor do a series of serious differences of opinion with the
Senate or presidential concessions in the confirmation process nec-
essarily signal a failed presidency or poor institutional leadership.
The critical thing is to examine how a President's handling of the
contests or concessions have figured into his attempt to achieve
some lasting change in the constitutional order. For instance, in the
nineteenth century President Jackson had more than his fair share
of heated confirmation battles with the Senate, but they often en-
tailed thinly veiled tugs of war between Jackson and his Senate
rivals-won more often than not by the former-over dismantling
the national bank, reforming and democratizing the national govern-
ment, and establishing presidential supremacy in formulating na-
tional policy.' In contrast, President Lincoln had no serious con-
firmation skirmishes to speak of because he used patronage to
secure the unity of the Republican party and popular and Senate
support for dismantling slavery, ensuring a strong chief executive,
preserving the Union, and setting the stage for Reconstruction.6
As Presidents Jackson's and Lincoln's performances in office
demonstrated, the management or leadership skills a President has
used (or not used) in the appointments process reflect or draw on
the same skills or judgment a President has employed (or has
failed to employ) generally to achieve the objectives of greatest
importance to him. Hence, the Senate's dramatic rejection of Presi-
dent Bush's Secretary of Defense nominee John Tower and near
rejection of his Supreme Court nominee Clarence Thomas over-
shadowed his many other successes in the confirmation process.
JUDICATURE 282, 284 (1993).
59. See Janet M. Martin, George Bush and the Executive Branch, in LEADERSHIP AND
THE BUSH PRESIDENCY: PRUDENCE OR DRIFr IN AN ERA OF CHANGE? 37, 53 (Ryan J.
Barilleaux & Mary E. Stuckey eds., 1992); see also Goldman, supra note 58, at 295,
297.
60. See SKOWRONEK, supra note 45, at 137-54.
61. See HARRIs, supra note 3, at 72.
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This was because the Tower and Thomas episodes highlighted
Bush's failure to map out beforehand a successful confirmation (or
legislative) strategy (including developing consensus within the
country or the Senate before acting) and to articulate (or command
public respect for) the vision underlying the nominations. In con-
trast, President Clinton has assiduously avoided controversy and
looked for compromise in the appointments process after having
made a few missteps early in his presidency. President Clinton's
willingness to compromise in making appointments, to map out
beforehand a strategy for making a successful nomination, to reor-
ganize his office or staff to maximize its quality of performance,
and to ensure to the extent possible public support for his most
high-profile nominees parallel his performance generally to look for
common ground with congressional leaders, to stand firn on a few
critical issues, and to compromise for the sake of keeping the
federal government energized and moving generally in a direction
of his liking.
To be sure, merely securing the appointments of people of high
quality and like mind (i.e., who largely agree with or support his
constitutional and programmatic visions) has been no guarantee of
a President's achievement of his preferred short- and long-term
institutional objectives. Generally, some relationship between a
President's use of his nominating power and exercise of other
executive powers almost always exists; the problem is to determine
the extent to which this has been constructive insofar as the presi-
dency and the nation's welfare are concerned, including the seri-
ousness of any missteps and the nature and ramifications of the
objectives sought. For example, President Teddy Roosevelt, who
saw himself initially as a President operating within the "Jackson-
Lincoln tradition" of presidential leadership (i.e., of trying to con-
struct a new constitutional order and understanding of the powers
of the presidency and the national government), 2 had enormous
success in the appointments process. Indeed, in the course of ex-
panding the domain of presidential power, particularly in transform-
ing it into a "bully pulpit," fighting the power of private corpora-
tions, and in championing "his vision of a better, more egalitarian
society,"63 Roosevelt insisted on maintaining high standards (in-
cluding ideological compatibility) for all of his federal appoint-
62. See THEODORE ROOSEVELT, AN AUrOBIoGRAPHY 379 (1913).
63. ABRAHAM, supra note 3, at 156.
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ments (including his three to the Supreme Court) and refused to
accept the recommendations of Senators of his party of people who
did not meet his standards."€ In spite of this rather aggressive
stance, Roosevelt had few contested nominations largely because of
the intimidating zeal with which he promoted his nominations and
his resolve to draw on his extraordinary popularity whenever it
suited his purposes. Nevertheless, Roosevelt, by his own admission
and the judgment of history, failed to anticipate or deal adequately
as President with all of the political fallout from or consequences
of many of the governmental and party reforms he had initially
championed and set into motion.6' In the end, it was a special
kind of appointment that symbolized Roosevelt's partial failure as a
leader. In choosing William Howard Taft as his successor, Roose-
velt failed to do the wise thing. In making this choice he not only
terminated his own institutional leadership but also chose a suc-
cessor who failed to exercise the kind of institutional leadership
Roosevelt had proven himself capable of exercising.6
Ironically, Roosevelt's subsequent split from the Republican
party and its leader (and his successor), Taft, paved the way for
the election of another committed reformer, Woodrow Wilson, who
was the advocate for and personification of the New Freedom's
quest for social and political, justice. Unlike Roosevelt, Wilson
preferred to work behind the scenes whenever possible in the ap-
pointments process and experienced only a few seriously contested
nominations, including most notoriously the first of his three Su-
preme Court appointments, Louis Brandeis, who was closely asso-
ciated with the boldness of Wilson's presidential vision and was a
controversial lawyer in his own right; thus he became the center of
one of the most protracted, heated, vicious, and bitter confirmation
contests in the century.' In contrast, Wilson studiously avoided
64. See id. at 156-57; HARRIs, supra note 3, at 80.
65. See SKOWRONEK, supra note 45, at 232.
66. Roosevelt is far from being alone in making a less than perfect choice of a suc-
cessor. In spite of his many premonitions of his own death, President Lincoln chose An-
drew Johnson as his second running mate. Johnson proved to be a disastrous choice, who
lacked leadership skills and failed completely to maintain good will or a good working
relationship with Congress. Similarly, President Jackson chose his close political ally Mar-
tin Van Buren as his successor, but Van Buren proved incapable of rising to the chal-
lenges of leading the nation on the path set by Jackson or, more importantly, out of its
first great depression.
67. See ABRAHAM, supra note 3, at 176-84.
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controversy in his nonjudicial appointments. 6 This proved to be
an astute judgment because Wilson was a plurality President who
needed to use patronage appointments to unify party loyalty and
support. Indeed, when Wilson became President in 1913, the Dem-
ocrats had been out of office for sixteen years, and there was a
substantial rush of aspiring appointees. Nonetheless, Wilson took
the advice of his closest advisers to turn over to the departments
the primary responsibility for handling most of the appointments of
significant officials within them. Moreover, when elected to the
presidency, Wilson had few political or personal debts to pay and
was able to pick his cabinet with great care, appointing the persons
he believed to be best qualified and generally committed to his
progressive policies.69 Generally, President Wilson secured the
unified support of his party by withdrawing cabinet or subcabinet
nominations if they met with significant opposition within his party
and by deferring whenever possible to party leaders interested in
securing the appointments of their favorites to certain important
offices. In dealing with the Senate on appointments, Wilson, like
Lincoln, rarely permitted patronage disputes to deflect him from
trying to coordinate his powers for the purpose of achieving certain
broader objectives and avoiding the alienation of members of his
party whose support he needed to ensure the success of his legisla-
tive program.
Subsequently, Presidents have delegated to subordinates the
important tasks of gathering, evaluating, and making recommenda-
tions, if not the actual selection, of important federal appointments.
Modem Presidents have coordinated the challenges of overseeing
substantially larger administrations (than those overseen by their
nineteenth century counterparts) with the personal obligations ex-
pected of all chief executives to interact with other political leaders
and constituents and the management of their other administrative,
policymaking, and speechwriting responsibilities.
68. See generally HARRIS, supra note 3, at 93-98.
69. In some cases, he chose people with whom he was not personally acquainted. This
practice brought him into conflict, however, with only one significant Cabinet ap-
pointee-William Jennings Bryan, who as Secretary of State embarrassed Wilson because
of his untiring efforts to find offices for many of his friends and supporters. See id. at
94.
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Of course, appointing someone is one thing, the work that
appointee does with others, including a President, is quite another.
Even in the latter case, it is asking a lot to attribute significant
constitutional change to the action(s) of a single appointee, espe-
cially that of a judge. The problem is that individuals acting alone
and not in tandem with others can accomplish very little in the
national government. This difficulty is compounded when a Presi-
dent does not have the means to control directly his appointee's
exercise of power.7 1 Significant change is much more likely to be
achieved through the combined or coordinated efforts of a team of
people; hence, a string of appointments and the consequent activi-
ties of those people as coordinated or managed by a President
provides a much more extensive record for assessing presidential
management. For example, President Jackson succeeded, despite
considerable resistance from the Senate during his eight years in
office, in reforming the national government and thus "providing
the American people with one of the most honest and least corrupt
,,71 Mroeadministrations in the early history of the nation. Moreover, in
making six, five, and nine appointments to the Supreme Court,
Presidents Jackson, Lincoln, and Roosevelt, respectively, succeeded
in changing its ideological composition n
Although the appointment of an able, well-qualified individual
is a significant short-term accomplishment, it ultimately says little
on its own about a President's management of his office or branch
to achieve certain long-term goals, such as influencing the direction
of the Supreme Court, which a President usually has achieved only
by having appointed several justices. One should also be careful
not to read too much into a single success; for instance, President
John Adams undoubtedly regarded his appointment of John Mar-
shall as a great achievement, but Marshall accomplished all that he
did on the Supreme Court without Adams' help.'3 Otherwise,
Adams' presidency generally gets average marks. 4
70. Obviously, this would be the difficulty with judicial appointments or with the ap-
pointments of the heads of independent or quasi-independent agencies. In contrast, the
President's ability to remove politically appointed officials within the executive branch
enables him to control their activities directly.
71. REMINI, supra note 57, at 331.
72. See ABRAHAM, siyra note 3, at 95-103 (Jackson), 117-24 (Lincoln), 208-40 (F.D.
Roosevelt).
73. See id. at 82-84.
74. See id. app. B at 415-17; see also Schlesinger, supra note 44, at 48-49 (generally
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Finally, it is important to understand that different Presidents
have had different agendas for diverse kinds of appointments (or
different appointments have sometimes figured differently into
different Presidents' agendas). Compare, for instance, the presiden-
cies of Dwight Eisenhower and William Howard Taft. Eisenhower
proved to be, in Stephen Skowronek's estimation, "a master" at not
doing more than he could realistically accomplish; hence, he "was
content to prune the radical edge off New Deal liberalism."'75 He
achieved a relatively well-defined, modest goal, but his achieve-
ment "faded quickly as a national political alternative upon his
departure [from office]."76 Moreover, Eisenhower did not include a
radical overhauling of the federal judiciary within his agenda.
While he preferred that his nonjudicial nominees share his political
commitments, he did not link his choice of judicial nominees to a
strict ideological litmus test. Consequently, Eisenhower's overall
performance in the appointments process was not neatly linked to a
general policy agenda. He deliberately chose not to pursue a full-
scale assault on the constitutional foundations of the New Deal, an
assault that would have required significantly different kinds of
judicial appointments.
Whereas President Eisenhower generally succeeded (at least for
a short time) in constraining legislative expansions of the New
Deal but not in reshaping the federal judiciary, William Howard
Taft was almost completely passive on legislative or policy matters
but took an active interest in judicial appointments.7 Both as
President and later as Chief Justice, Taft selected judges based
primarily on their adherence to economic due process and antipathy
towards progressive legislation.78 Through the six Supreme Court
appointments he made in a single term79 and the influence he
exerted over lower court nominations for almost three decades, Taft
was instrumental in putting into place a federal judiciary that resist-
ed progressive legislation until Franklin Roosevelt's second term in
office.
describing the criteria for measuring the quality of different presidencies and concluding
with a rating of "average" for President John Adams).
75. SKOWRONEK, supra note 45, at 46.
76. Id.
77. See GERALD R. GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 272-75
(1994).
78. See id. at 273.
79. See ABRAHAM, supra note 3, at 166.
13891997]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
B. Factors Impeding or Facilitating Presidential
Control of the Appointments Process
A close examination of the internal dynamics of the federal
appointments process reveals that some factors have made more of
a difference than others to presidential achievements of their most
precious objectives in this area (without undue political costs at-
tached). For instance, a President's popularity is potentially a pow-
erful weapon to wield, for it signals to anyone or any institution
bent on crossing the President of the possibility of a serious back-
lash from the American people. The challenge for a popular Presi-
dent is to take advantage of his popularity judiciously (i.e., to use
it when it can benefit him and his administrative goals the most
and to avoid squandering it on unimportant things). Ironically,
presidential popularity can be crucial for triggering political support
for important nominations or related causes. Conversely, Presidents
who have squandered their popularity have found this problem to
come back to haunt them frequently in the confirmation process.
Indeed, one major factor that has the potential to undo a nomina-
tion is to treat a nomination as embodying some unpopular pro-
gram, policy, or feature. In this situation, a nominee can become a
political casualty because of some serious grievance one or more
Senators have with a President. Because this kind of opposition
treats the nominee as effectively a proxy or substitute for the Presi-
dent, it can constitute a relatively awkward basis for mobilizing
public opinion against a particular nominee. Nevertheless, opposing
a nominee because of a desire to punish a President has two ad-
vantages insofar as the Senate is concerned. The first is that the
President has little or no control to prevent it. The second is that it
is potentially a problem for a President whenever the Senate con-
siders a nomination and thus is difficult to .anticipate or plan for.
Invariably, the federal appointments process provides a venue
or forum in which to test the popularity of Presidents or their
policies. The more unpopular a President or the more controversial
one of his policies the likelier it will be that a confirmation contest
will arise with respect to a nominee closely associated with those
things that have made a President or policy unpopular. An excel-
lent example of this phenomenon is the Senate's rejection of Roger
Taney as President Jackson's second Secretary of the Treasury-the
first time in American history the Senate formally rejected a cabi-
1390 [Vol. 47:1359
APPOINTMENTS PERSPECTIVE
net nominee." Although the Senate had confirmed Roger Taney
as President Jackson's second Attorney General in 1831, it rejected
his nomination three years later as Secretary of the Treasury. This
rejection occurred because a majority of Senators disapproved of
Taney's conduct in the interim as Acting Treasury Secretary in
overseeing the withdrawal of funds from and effective dismantle-
ment of the national bank in response to what Jackson regarded as
its corrupt mismanagement. No one questioned Taney's ability, but
Taney's nomination as Treasury Secretary (and not long thereafter
as an Associate Justice) provided a perfect opportunity for the
Senate to debate the propriety of the President's policies and
Taney's own actions regarding the national bank.
Another more recent example of this is President Clinton's
unsuccessful nomination of his National Security Adviser Anthony
Lake in 1997 to head the CIA."' Lake ultimately withdrew his
nomination when it became apparent that some powerful Republi-
can Senators were delaying indefinitely the final Senate vote be-
cause of unresolved questions about his managerial skills and pos-
sible involvement in inappropriate fundraising activities undertaken
by his staff. Even though the latter might not have been illegal,
Lake, like Taney before him in dealing with the national bank, was
associated with and had allegedly engaged in or allowed something
to occur that the President's political foes in the Senate regarded as
inappropriate.
Sometimes the unpopularity of a President is so widespread or
extreme as to trigger resistance. For example, the steady opposition
in the Senate to President Tyler's nominees for the Supreme Court
seats derived not from flaws in the nominees' records but rather
from widespread contempt in the Senate for Tyler, who was
viewed as a weak President destined to serve only one term.'
Another example is the forced withdrawal of President Lyndon
Johnson's nomination of Abe Fortas as Chief Justice after Fortas'
Democratic supporters failed to stop a filibuster against the nomi-
nation based in part on Johnson's growing unpopularity and the
expectation among Senate Republicans that Johnson would be
80. See generally C.B. SWISHER, ROGER B. TANEY 190-288 (1935).
81. See supra note 12.
82. See ABRAHAM, supra note 3, at 106-07.
139119971
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
replaced by Richard Nixon, whom Fortas' opponents preferred to
fill Earl Warren's seat. 3
Another significant factor that can make or break a nomination
is a President's organizational capability or institutional support,
including the strength of his party in the Senate. This factor clearly
implicates a President's leadership and administrative skills, for it
requires assessing both generally and in particular cases a
President's management and communication skills; sense of timing;
ability to cultivate and take advantage of good relations with key
Senate leaders or forces; and abilities to assemble and coordinate a
good support staff and to mobilize public support and opinion.
The extent to which a President has any or all of these skills
or abilities is one thing, while another is the context in which he
has been challenged to develop or exercise one or more of them.
Figuring out the context clarifies the size and range of challenges
that he must confront and overcome in order to achieve his priori-
ties. For instance, the composition of the Senate generally makes a
big difference and can be a huge obstacle a President must over-
come in implementing his agenda, including his preferred judicial
and nonjudicial appointments. Whether or not the President's politi-
cal party has controlled the Senate has posed serious consequences
for presidential performance in the federal appointments process.
For example, the correlation between party membership and Su-
preme Court confirmation votes has remained quite strong
throughout American history. 4 In one study, Professor Robert
Scigliano found that the confirmation rate for Supreme Court jus-
tices was ninety-one percent when the President's party controlled
the Senate, while the rate dropped to forty-two percent when the
President's party did not control the Senate.85 Another study found
that the confirmation rate was ninety percent in the first three years
of office but less than sixty-seven percent in the fourth year.8"
83. See MASSARO, supra note 3, at 55-77.
84. See generally John D. Felice & Herbert F. Weisber, Senate Confirmation of Su-
preme Court Justices: The Changing Importance of Ideology, Party, and Region in Su-
preme Court Nominees, 1953-88, 77 KY. LJ. 509, 511-12 (1989) (discussing the corre-
lates between political parties and Supreme Court confirmation votes).
85. See SCIGLIANO, supra note 24, at 97-98.
86. See S. WASBY, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 128 (3d
ed. 1988). In yet another study, Professor Segal provided the first multivariate analysis of
the historical record, using a probit analysis to study the determinants of the confirmation
of appointments. See Jeffrey A. Segal, Senate Confirmation of Supreme Court Justices:
Partisan and Institutional Politics, 49 J. POL. 998, 1003-05 (1986); see also Jeffrey A.
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Moreover, the political realities of divided government have
proved to be a significant challenge for Presidents, particularly
those eager for great change or reform, in the federal appointments
process. For example, President Andrew Jackson's newly organized
Democratic party controlled half of the seats in the Senate from
1833-35."7 Jackson understood the magnitude of this dilemma.
Thus, after the Senate blocked Roger Taney's nomination as an
Associate Justice only six months after rejecting Taney for Trea-
sury Secretary,88 Jackson continued to look for ways in which to
vindicate his friend and his policies regarding the national bank.
His last year in office coincided with another cycle of elections to
the Senate, and Jackson stumped for Democratic candidates. In the
meantime, Chief Justice Marshall had died, and Jackson nominated
Taney yet again. Jackson's campaigning paid off, because it helped
to ensure his party's control of the Senate by the largest margin
yet in his term of office. The new majority confirmed Taney as
Chief Justice. Jackson had won.89 Jackson's persistence, awareness
of the significance of the composition of the Senate, and willing-
ness to use his popularity and his office to work for changing the
composition of the Senate enabled him to wrest from Congress
presidential control of certain prerogatives, such as articulating
national policy or claiming the entitlement to a popular mandate as
the only nationally elected official; in the end, he succeeded in
putting certain key people into place, implementing his program of
Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, If a Supreme Court Vacancy Occurs, Will the Senate Confirm
a Reagan Nominee?, 69 JUDICATURF 186, 189 (1986). Segal's final model shows signifi-
cant effects for a number of factors, including whether the opposition party controlled the
Senate, whether the nominee was a sitting senator, whether the nomination occurred in the
fourth year of a president's term, whether the nominee was a member of the cabinet, how
long the nominee had served in the national legislature, and whether the nomination oc-
curred in the twentieth century. See id. Professors Lemieux and Stewart have also used
logit analysis of the same historical record and found a close proximity between the party
mixes on the Court and in the Senate. See Peter H. Lemieux & Charles H. Stewart,
Advise? Yes. Consent? Maybe. Senate Confirmation of Supreme Court Justices (1988)
(paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association).
87. See HARRIS, supra note 3, at 63.
88. See generally id. at 62, 63.
89. Neither the irony nor the significance of Jackson's victory eluded him. Two days
before his second term came to an end in 1837, Jackson wrote to a friend that he was
looking forward with deep satisfaction to the "glorious scene of Mr. Van Buren, once
rejected by the Senate, swom into office by Chief Justice Taney, who [had twice] been
rejected by the factious Senate." HARRIS, supra note 3, at 64 (citation omitted).
139319971
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
weakening the national bank, and invigorating states' rights without
acceding to nullification or succession.'
Lame duck Presidents or Presidents facing reelection have
faced the stiffest opposition to their nominations from their political
foes in the Senate during presidential election years.9 For exam-
ple, in the closing days of the Taft administration, the Progressives
joined with the Democrats to prevent the Senate -from going into
executive session to confirm 1,300 nominations submitted by
Taft.' Moreover, the opposition party has generally slowed down
or stalled judicial nominations, particularly to the Supreme Court,
as the date of a presidential election has drawn nearer.93 The
Democratic majority in the Senate effectively stopped holding
confirmation hearings for President Bush's judicial nominees begin-
ning in the summer preceding the 1992 presidential election.94
Consequently, President Clinton inherited dozens of judicial vacan-
cies.9" No sooner did the Republicans retake control of the Senate
in 1994 than they began to slow down the processing of President
Clinton's judicial appointments, precipitating one of the longest
periods of paralysis in processing judicial appointments in Ameri-
can history.' At year's end in 1996, the Senate had approved
only seventeen judicial nominations-none on the federal courts of
appeals. This is the lowest number of successful lower court nomi-
nations ever made in a single year by a post-World War II Presi-
dent.
Timing can become a problem in a different way. Sometimes
Presidents move too slowly in nominating someone (i.e., waiting
until too late in the term)' or coming to the defense of an embat-
90. See LEONARD WHITE, THE JACKSONIANS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY
106-07 (1954).
91. See generally Thomas Halper, Supreme Court Appointments: Criteria and Conse-
quences, 21 N.Y. L. FORUM 563, 563-84 (1976); Thomas Halper, Senate Rejection of Su-
preme Court Nominees, 22 DRAKE L. REV. 102, 102-12 (1972).
92. See HARRIS, supra note 3, at 94.
93. See Sheldon Goldman, Bush's Judicial Legacy: The Final Imprint, 76 JUDICATURE
282, 284 (1993) ("Traditionally, minimal confirmation activity occurs during presidential
years, especially when the Senate is controlled by one party and the White House by
another.").
94. See id.
95. See id. at 277.
96. See id.
97. Sometimes delaying nominations can turn into a problem. Presidents may wait until
too late in their terms of office to avoid having opposing forces in the Senate, as
described above, try to slow down or stall the processing of their nominations pending
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tied nominee or in organizing support for a nominee. For instance,
President Reagan nominated Robert Bork to the Supreme Court in
the middle of the summer of 1987, but he allowed the Democrats
who controlled the Senate to postpone Bork's confirmation hearings
until after Labor Day.98 Bork's opposition used the summer to
organize and to attack the nomination publicly. By the time Presi-
dent Reagan rallied to Bork's defense, the hearings had begun, and
the nominee was already seriously wounded. A similar problem
arose with President Clinton's nomination of Lani Guinier to head
the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department." The nomi-
nation quickly drew fire from conservatives, but neither President
Clinton nor any of his top political appointees came to the
nominee's defense. Guinier was forced to withdraw her nomination
without any show of support from the President.
A badly conceived defensive strategy can hurt a nomination
almost as much as a belated or nonexistent defense. Consider, for
example, Richard Nixon's first two attempts to fill Abe Fortas' seat
on the Supreme Court. In both cases, Nixon failed to devise or
employ effective operations within his administration for evaluating
nominees' backgrounds; to develop intelligent strategies for secur-
ing confirmation; and to provide the means for overseeing and
maintaining a good working relationship with the Senate."
Poorly conceived staffing can also undo or impede nomina-
tions. Such was the problem with George Bush's system for evalu-
ating prospective judicial nominees."°' Whereas President Reagan
had delegated primary responsibility for assessing the ideological
credentials of prospective judicial nominees to the Justice Depart-
ment, President Bush delegated this task to both the Justice De-
partment and White House Counsel's Office. This duplication cost
the President precious time in processing potential judicial nomina-
tions. '0
the outcome of the sitting president's reelection effort. As I have already suggested,
numerous judicial nominations made by both Presidents Bush and Clinton prior to the
final years of their first terms fell prey to this difficulty.
98. See BRONNER, supra note 27, at 202-03.
99. See CARTER, supra note 1, at 168.
100. See MASSARO, supra note 3, at 79, 106, 144.
101. See generally Sheldon Goldman, The Bush Imprint on the Judiciary: Carrying on a
Tradition, 74 JUDicATuRE 294, 296-98 (1991).
102. See id (contrasting both presidents' organizations for judicial selection).
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A contrasting example to Bush's flawed system for judicial
selection is the one adopted by President Ford for nominating
someone to replace Justice Douglas on the Court."3 Ford divided
the responsibility for counseling him between his Attorney General,
Edward Levi, and his White House Counsel Phil Buchen; he
charged Levi with the task of assembling a list of potential candi-
dates based largely on professional ability and a moderate judicial
ideology, while he asked Buchen to assess the political ramifica-
tions of different potential nominees. Levi's and Buchen's offices
interacted like clockwork, and once a nominee was chosen the
Senate moved quickly to approve him unanimously.
The fact that institutional organization or support or associating
a nominee with some potential danger to the public or something
problematic with the President constitutes the strongest trigger for
mobilizing public support for or against a nomination has serious
consequences for constitutional law. The utilization of such factors
suggests that the President and the Senate have tended to treat
judicial and nonjudicial nominations in some strikingly similar
ways. For instance, the first factor's focus on the potential for
demonizing or creating a halo effect for a nominee treats the
person's philosophy about government as a potentially disqualifying
concern. The policy could be related to the judiciary (such as its
role within the constitutional order) but does not have to be. Con-
sequently, one finds that nominees will be rejected for their politi-
cal philosophies, regardless of the positions they are seeking. To be
sure, judicial and nonjudicial nominees do receive some different
treatment; the former are often scanned more closely by both the
President and the Senate because they will have life tenure. Even
so, the lower the profile of the nominee the more outrageous the
person's philosophy has to be in order to create a plausible case
for public concern about the person's appointment. As the nom-
inee's chances for elevation to more powerful positions rises so too
do the costs of a President's-or, for that matter, a Senator's-sup-
porting or opposing the nomination.
103. See generally Victor H. Kramer, The Case of Justice Stevens: How to Select, Nom-
inate, and Confirm a Justice of the United States Supreme Court, 7 CONST. CoMm. 325
(1990).
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CONCLUSION
The temptation to explain or analyze complex events in sim-
plistic terms is understandably strong. For over two hundred years,
it has dominated efforts to understand and evaluate presidential per-
formance in the federal appointments process. This paper's purpose
has been to suggest the significance of both the outside and inside
perspectives for such efforts. On the one hand, as Professors Lowi
and Tulis have suggested, it is important not to lose sight of the
external social, political, economic, and historical forces constrain-
ing or influencing presidential decision-making or performance;
these factors demonstrate, inter alia, the limitations or the value of
constitutional or formal structure. On the other hand, a President's
organization within his office or administration for assisting with
appointments matters, and a President's interaction with the Senate
or other interested constituencies, clearly reflects his management
skills and effects the quality of his appointments decisions.
Moreover, this paper has given special attention to the internal
dynamics of the federal appointments process in the hopes of pro-
viding a crucial step in expanding understanding and developing
meaningful criteria for evaluating presidential performance in the
appointments process. Institutional analysis is especially helpful for
focusing attention on the special significances of a President's
managerial or leadership skills in shaping or organizing the office
of the presidency and in coordinating constructively his exercise of
his nominating power with his use of other executive powers for
the purpose of achieving lasting constitutional and political change
or improvement. In addition, institutional analysis helps to provide
the means for comparing presidential performance in the appoint-
ments process that cuts across different historical periods. Both
institutional analysis and sensitivity to historical changes, develop-
ments, and movements involving the evolution of the presidency
will help to demystify the appointments process. Demystifying the
appointments process is crucial for measuring presidential achieve-
ment of certain short- and long-term objectives and the quality and
nature of presidential-senatorial interaction regarding matters of
mutual concern to each institution. In the end, it is a mistake in
practice or study to divorce the appointments process from the
larger contexts of which it is a part. Until constitutional scholars
learn this simple lesson, the federal appointments process will
remain a mystery to many of those who profess to be its oracles.
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